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WESTERN TRANSPORTATION CO. v. DOWNER.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. DOWNER.
In an action against a carrier for injury to goods, an instruction that "if the
jury believe from the evidence that the loss of the coffee in controversy was
within one of the exceptions contained in the bill of lading-that is to say, if it
was occasioned by perils of navigation of the lakes and rivers, then the burden
of showing that this loss might have been avoided by the exercise of proper care
and skill is upon the plaintiff; then it is for him to show that the loss was the
result of negligence," was a correct statement of the law, and should have been
given.
Where the carrier has given evidence from which the jury may infer that the
injury occurred from a cause excepted in the bill of lading, the burden is cast
oi the plaintiff to show negligence.
An instruction that 11the bill of lading in this case excepts the defendant from
liability from perils of navigation, it is incumbent on the defendant to bring itself
within the exception, and it is the duty of the defendant to show that it has not
been guilty of negligence," is erroneous.
The terms "dangers of lake navigation" include all the ordinary perils which
attend navigation on the lakes, and among others, that which arises from shallowness of the waters at the entrance of harbors.
A presumption of negligence from the simple occurrence of an accident seldom
arises except where the accident proceeds from an act of such a character that,
when due care is taken in its performance, no injury ordinarily ensues from it in
similar cases, or where it is caused by the mismanagement or misconstruction of
a thing over which the defendant has immediate control, and for the management
or construction of which he is responsible.

THIS was an action in the Circuit Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, against a ,carrier for injury to coffee shipped
on one of its boats from New York to Chicago.
At the trial the plaintiff proved the delivery of the coffee to the
defendant in good condition, and its arrival at Chicago damaged;
and then rested. Defendants then proved that by the bill of
lading they were exempted from liability for losses by the
"dangers of navigation on the lakes and rivers ;" that the boat
in its attempt to enter the harbor of Chicago struck on the
bottom, grounded and lay until the next day, shipping so much
water as to ruin the coffee; that the vessel was staunch, and that
the captain was a careful and experienced seaman. Considerable
evidence was given by defendant, and subsequently by plaintiff,
by which it appeared that the vessel undertook to enter at about
eight o'clock on a dark and stormy night; that the channel of
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entrance to the port was narrow and somewhat shifting; in fact
had shifted somewhat during the two seasons previous to this
accident; that the captain had not entered the port for about
two years previous, and that another vessel drawing more water
had come safely into the port somewhat later the same night.
There was considerable conflict of testimony as to the proper
course for a master to pursue under the circumstances, and the
prudence and skill of the captain's action in this case.
The defendant requested the court to charge that "if the jury
believe from the evidence that the loss of the coffee in controversy was within one of the exceptions contained in the bill of
lading offered in evidence-that is to say, if it -was occasioned
by perils of navigation of the lakes and rivers, then the burden
of showing that this loss might have been avoided by the exercise
of proper care and skill is upon the plaintiff; then it is for him to
show that the loss was the result of negligence."
This the court declined to do, and charged that "the bill of
lading in this case excepts the defendant from liability, when the
property is not insured, from perils of navigation. It is incumbent on the defendant to bring itself within the exception, and it
is the duty of the defendant to show that it has not been guilty
of negligence."
To both of these points defendant excepted, and the jury having
found a verdict for plaintiff, the defendant brought this writ of
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J. (after stating the facts).-On the trial the plaintiff
made out a pimd facie case by producing the bill of lading,
showing the receipt of the coffee by the company at New York,
and the contract for its transportation to Chicago, and by proving
the arrival of the coffee at the latter place in the propeller Brooklyn in a rained condition, and the consequent damages sustained.
The company met this primel facie case by showing that the loss
of the coffee was occasioned in the manner already. stated; that
is, by one of the dangers of lake navigation. These terms, "dangers of lake navigation," include all the ordinary perils which
attend navigation on the lakes, and among others, that which
arises from shallowness of the waters at the entrance of harbors
formed from them. The plaintiff then introduced, testimony to
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show that this danger, and the consequent loss, might have been
avoided by the exercise of proper care and skill on the part of
the defendant. If the danger might have been thus avoided, it
is plain that the loss should be attributed to the negligence and
inattention of the company, and it should be held liable, notwithstanding the exception in the bill of lading. The burden of
- establishing such negligence and inattention rested with the plaintiff, but the court refused an instruction to the jury to that effect,
prayed by the defendant, and instructed them that it was the duty
of the defendant to show that it had not been guilty of negligence.
In this respect the court erred. In Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How.
272, the precise point was involved, and the decision of the court
in that case is decisive of the question in this. And that decision rests on principle. A peril of navigation having been shown
to exist, and to have occasioned the loss which is the subject of
complaint, the defendant was primd face'e relieved from liability,
for the loss was thus brought within the exceptions of the bill of
lading. There was no presumption, from the simple fact of a
loss occurring in this way, that there was any negligence on the
part of the company. A presumption of negligence from the
simple occurrence of an accident seldom arises except where the
accident proceeds from an act of such a character that, when due
care is taken in its performance, no injury ordinarily ensues from
it in similar cases, or where it is caused by the mismanagement
or misconstruction of a thing over which the defendant has immediate control, and for the management or construction of which
he is responsible. Thus, in Scott v. The London and St. Catharine Dock Company, 8 H. & C. 596, the plaintiff was injured by
bags of sugar falling from a crane in which they were lowered to
the ground from a warehouse by the defendant, and the court
said, "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care."
So in Curtis v. The Bochester and Syracuse Bailroad Company,
18 N. Y. 543, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the
mere fact that a passenger on a railroad car was injured by the
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train running off a switch was not of itself, without proof of the
circumstances under which the accident occurred, presumptive
evidence of negligence on the part of the company. The court
said zhat carriers of passengers were not insurers, and that many
injuries might occur to those they transported for which they
were not responsible, but as railroad companies were bound to
keep their roads, carriages, and all apparatus employed in working them, free from any defect which the utmost knowledge, skill,
and vigilance could discover or prevent, if it appeared that an
accident was caused by any deficiency in the road itself, the
cars, or any portion of the apparatus belonging to the company
and used in connection with its business, a presumption of negligence on the part of those whose duty it was to see that everything was in order immediately arose, it being extremely unlikely
that any defect should exist of so hidden a nature that no degree
of skill or care could have seen or discovered it.
It is plain that the grounds stated in these cases, upon which a
presumption of negligence arises when an accident has occurred,
have no application to the case at bar. The grounding of the
propeller and the consequent loss of the coffee may have been
consistent With the highest care and skill of the master, or it may
have resulted from his negligence and inattention. The accident
itself, irrespective of the circumstances, furnished no ground for
any presumption one way or the other. If, therefore, the establishment of the negligence of the defendant was material to the
recovery by the plaintiff, the burden of proof rested upon him.
For the error in the refusal of the instruction prayed and in
the instruction given, the judgmeht must be reversed, and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
The foregoing case presents with un- The carrier then has the burden of
goods were lost through
usual singleness, the question of the showing that the
for which he was not responsible;
burden of proof in actions against a a cause
e. g. the act of God, the negligence of
carrier for loss of goods, where the dein the
fence is that the loss occurred from a the plaintiff, or a cause excepted
there
point
this
to
Up
of
lading.
bill
cause excepted in the contract of bailis no difference in the decisions either
ment.
English or American. But although
The plaintiff in actions of this kind
having proved the delivery of the goods the loss may have occurred through
to the carrier, and the carrier's failure one of the excepted causes, yet if it
to deliver at the destination, has primad could have been avoided by proper care
facie made out his case and may rest. and skill on the part of the carrier, he
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will still be responsible, and if, as in the
principal case, the evidence as to care
and skill be conflicting, upon whom is
the burden of proof?
Upon one hand he carrier alleges an
exception to his liability, and he must
bring himself within it. The "dangers
of navigation," for example, are such
dangers as skill and diligence cannot provide against. The carrier does not bring
himself within the exception, unless he
shows that he used skill and diligence.
The burden is on him to show all the
elements which are required to make up
the exception which relieves him; not
merely the accident, but his freedom
from negligence contributory to it. Proof
in the principal case that the vessel ran
aground, and sprang a leak, whereby
the coffee was damaged, did not prove
that she ran aground by a danger of
navigation.
Something more was required in the way of affirmative proof
that the accident was unavoidable by
ordinary care and skill, and this proof
the carrier was bound to furnish.
On the other hand the ground of the
carrier's liability in the case presented,
is his negligence, and negligence is a
fact not to be presumed, but to be proved
by the party alleging it. The burden
of proof does not shift from time to
time during the trial (though the weight
of the evidence may) but remains on the
party on whom it is first cast, unless the
other party defends on a new and disThe party to the
tinct proposition.
support ofwhose causeproofofnegligence
isnecessary, has the burden in the first
instance, and it remains with him
throughout.
1. Prof. Greenleaf lays down the rule;
"If the acceptance of the goods was
special, the burden of proof is still on
the carrier to show, not only that the
cause of the loss was within the terms
of the exception, but also that there
was on his part no negligence or want

of due care:" 2 Greenleaf on Evidence,
sec. 219.
In Whitesides v. Russell, 8 W. & S.
44, a steamboat ran- on a rock in the
Ohio river and knocked a hole in her
bottom, whereby her cargo was damaged.
The bill of lading excepted losses by
94dangers 6f the river," and the carrier
was held to have the onus of proving,
not only how the loss occurred, but that
he had used due diligence and skill.
So also in Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Penna.
St. 378, where LowRTE, C. J., says:
"cFrom the very nature of the relation
the burden of the proof of a loss by inevitable accident is thrown upon the
carrier. He must prove not only an
accident which the law admits as inevitable in its character, but also that he was
9 uiltyd of nofault in falling into the danger, or in his efforts to extricate himself
from it."
And in Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St.
382, RATiEY,

J., states the argument

on this side with great clearness: "Counsel for the plaintiffs in error admit that
it was incumbent upon them to have
shown that the goods were lost by one
of the excepted perils ; but they insist
that the burden of proof was then
shifted upon the owners, and that they
were bound to prove negligence before
the carriers could be charged. We
think this dividing a thing in its nature
indivisible. Either the loss was occasioned by a peril of navigation, or by
the negligence of those in charge of the
boat. It must have been one or the
other, and could not have been both. If
proper care could have avoided it, it was
not a peril incident to navigation; if
such care could not, it was. From the
very nature of the undertaking, without
care the loss was inevitable; and with
care it might be unavoidable. From the
failure to deliver the goods, the law
raised the presumption of negligence
against the carriers-primdfacie, the
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fault was theirs-and this presumption
could only be rebutted by showing that
they were without fault. As positive
care was indispensable to the safety of
the goods, they could meet and overthrow the legal presumption of negligence in no other way than by showing
that such care was exercised. Proof that
the boat was snagged, fell short of proving that it was not snagged by the fault
of those in charge of it; and, consequently, short of overcoming the prima
facie case of the plaintiffs below. To
do this, it was not enough to have shown
that the loss was occasioned by what
might or might not have been a danger
of navigation ; nothing short of proof
that it was the one and not the other
could have been sufficient; as nothing
short of that could bring the case within
the exception provided for in the contract. "
This rule is well established in other
states: Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich.
268; Baker v. Brinson, 9 Rich. 201;
Berry v. Cooper, 28 Geo. 543; Turney
Y. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340; Hill v. Sturgeon, 28 Mo. 327. See also Murphy v.
Staton, 3 Munford 239 ; Michads v. N. Y.
6-c. B. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564, and Bead
v. Spaulding, 30 N. Y. 630.
2. Muddle v. Stride, 9 C. & P. 380,
was an action for damage to goods, and
the carriers defended on the ground that
the damage was caused by a peril of the
sea. Lord DzNmA, in charging the
jury, said, "The injury appears to me
of a very mysterious kind. The goods
appear to have been injured by some
liquid of an offensive character. If you
think that was the consequence of any
ill care in the packing of the goods on
board the vessel the defendants will be
liable. * * * If on the whole in your
opinion it is left in doubt what the cause
of the damage was, then the defendants
will be entitled to your verdict, because
you are to see clearly that they were
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guilty of negligence before you can find
a verdict against them. If it turns out
that the injury may as well be attributable to the one cause as the other, then
also the defendants will be entitled to
your verdict." This was a nisi prius
case, tried in 1840, and we cannot find
that the precise point as to the burden
of proof has since arisen in the English
courts.
In the case of Clark v. Barnwell, 12
Howard 272, the Supreme Court of the
United States adopted the rule of Lord
DENMAIT in Muddle v. Stride, and held
in the language of NELsON, J., who
delivered the opinion, that "Although
the loss occurs by a peril of the sea, yet
if it might have been avoided by skill
and diligence at the time, the carrier is
liable. But in this stage and posture
of the case, the burden is on the plaintiff
to establish the negligence, as the affirmative lies on him."
This case did not perhaps on the facts
as reported, go the full length of deciding
that where the evidence shows only a
state of facts from which the jury may
infer that the loss was by a peril of the
sea, the burden is on plaintiff to prove
negligence affirmatively, but it certainly
tended strongly that way, and has usually
been so considered in the cases which
have subsequently arisen in the circuit
and district courts.
Thus in Hunt v. The Propeller Caeveland, 6 TcL. 76, there was no positive
proof as to how the damage occurred, but
it was in evidence that the vessel was
tight and staunch when she started, and
that she had encountered a heavy gale,
during which the sea made a clean breach
over her and stove in the larboard gangway, which caused her to ship a large
quantity of water. DRUMMOND, J., in
.
deliveringjudgment said: "it seemsfairly to be inferred from the proofs that the
damage was caused by the gale of wind
which resulted in wetting the merchandise
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either by leakage of the vessel or by
shipping water. The damage is thus
shown to be caused by the dangers of
navigation. It follows that the shipper
must establish negligence or want of
skill in the carrier." See also Turner
v. 71e Black Warrior, I McA. 181 ;
N. J. Steamboat Co. v. Merchants' Bank,
6 How. 344.
The instruction refused by the court
below, in the principal case, that "if
the jury believe from the evidence that the
loss of the coffee in controversy was within
one of the exceptions contained in the bill
of lading-that is to say, if it was
occasioned by perils of navigation of the
lakes'and rivers, then the burden of showing that .this loss might have been avoided
by the exercise of proper care and skill is
upon the plaintiff," was correct according

to all the cases; for the point at which
they diverge is where on the evidence the
jury may be in doubt whether the losswas
within the exception or not. (And it is
just at this point that the burden of
proof becomes important.) The judgment therefore was properly reversed
for this error, but the Supreme Court
must be considered as going to the full
length and settling the rule in the federal
courts, that where the carrier gives sufficient evidence to justify the jury in inferring that the loss arosefrom an excepted
cause, though on the whole evidence the
cause be left doubtful, there the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
negligence. This rule we think is to be
regretted, as it is at variance with that
established in the principal state courts.
.T. T. M.

Supreme Court of llinois.
THE PEOPLE

EX RtEL.

O'CONNEL v. TURNER.

An Act of the legislature creating a reform school, and providing for the summary commitment to it of children who are "destitute of proper parental care
and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice," is unconstittional,
as it prescribes a virtual imprisonment without due process of law.
Besides the objection to the summary method of proceeding prescribed, such
an act, so far as it restrains liberty for any cause except actual crime, is in violation of the Bill of Rights, which declares that all men have certain inherent
rights, among which is liberty.
The rights of the state and of parents over children, stated and discussed by
TI[ORNTON, J.

THIS was a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the superintendcnt of the Reform School of the city of Chicago.
The first act, in relation to this " Reform School," is a part
of the charter of the city of Chicago, approved February 13th
1863, and the second is entitled "An Act in reference to the
Reform School of the City of Chicago," approved March 5th

1867.

The first section establishes a school for the safe keeping,

education, employment, and reformation of"all children, between
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the ages of six and sixteen years, who are destitute of proper
parental care, and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice." Section four of the Act of 1867, provides that,
"whenever any public magistrate or justice of the peace shall
have brought before him any boy or girl, between the ages of six
and sixteen years, who he has reason to believe is a vagrant, or
is destitute of proper parental care, or is growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice," he shall cause such boy or
girl to be arrested, and together with the witnesses, taken before
one of the judges of the Superior or Circuit Courts of Cook
county. The judge is empowered to issue a summons or order
in writing to the child's father, mother, guardian, or whosoever
may have the care of the child, in the order named, and if there
be none such, to any person, at his discretion, to appear, at.the
time and place mentioned, and show cause why the child should
not be committed to the Reform School, and upon return of due
service of the summons, an investigation 'shall be had. The
section then directs, "if upon such examination, such judge
shall be of opinion that said boy or girl is a proper subject for
commitment to the .Reform School, and that his or her moral
welfare, and the good of society, require that he or she should be
sent to said school for employment, instruction, and eformation,
he shall so decide, and direct the clerk, of the court of which
he is judge, to make out a warrant of commitment to said
Reform School, and such child shall thereupon be committed."
Section 9 of the Act of 1863, directs that all persons between
six and sixteen years of age convicted of crime, punishable by
fine or imprisonment, who in the opinion of the court would be
proper subjects for commitment, shall be committed to said school.
Section 10 authorizes the confinement of the children, and
that they "1shall be kept, disciplined, instructed, employed, and
governed," until they shall be reformed and discharged, or shall
have arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and that the sole
authority to discharge shall be in the Board of Guardians.
The facts were that the relator's son Daniel O'Connel, a boy
of fourteen, was committed to the Reform School, under the provisions of the acts above quoted, by a warrant from one of the
judges of the Superior Court, setting forth that the said Daniel
had "been found by competeht evidence to be a proper subject
for commitment to the said Reform School, and whose moral
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welfare and the good of society, require that he should be sent
to said school for instruction, employment, and reformation."
The only question raised was the power of the legislature to
pass the acts under which the boy was committed to the school.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THORNTON, J. (after stating the facts).-The warrant of commitment does not indicate that the arrest was made for a criminal offence. Hence, we conclude that it was issued, under the
general grant of power to arrest and confine for misfortune.
The contingencies enumerated, upon the happening of either of
which, the power may be exercised, are vagrancy, destitution of
proper parental care, mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice.
Upon proof of any one, the child is deprived of home and parents,
and friends, and confined for more than half of an ordinary life.
It is claimed that the law is administered for the moral welfare
and intellectual improvement of the minor, and the good of
society. From the record before us, we know nothing of the
management. We are only informed, that a father desires the
custody of his child, and that he is restrained of his liberty.
Therefore, we can only look at the language of the law, and the
power granted.
What is proper parental care ? The best and kindest parents
would differ, in the attempt to solve the question. Scarcely any
two agree; and when we consider the watchful supervision which is
so unremitting over the domestic affairs of others, the conclusion
is forced upon us, that there is not a child in the land, who could
not be proved, by two or.more witnesses, to be in this sad condition. Ignorance, idleness, vice, are relative terms. Ignorance
is always preferable to error; but at most, is only venial. It
may be general, or it may be limited. Though it is sometimes
said that "idleness is the parent of vice," yet the former may
exist without the latter. It is strictly an abstinence from labor
or employment. If the child perform all its duties to parents
and society, the state has no right to compel it to labor. Vice
is a very comprehensive term; acts, wholly innocent in the
estimation of many good men, would, according to the code of
ethics of others, show fearful depravity. What is the standard
to be ? What extent of enlightenment, what amount of industry,
what degree of virtue will save from the threatened imprisonment?
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In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civil life, we
should not forget the rights, which inhere both in parents and
children. The principle of the absorption of the child in, and
its complete subjection to the despotism of the state, is wholly
inadmissible in the modern civilized world.
The parent has the right to the care, custody, and assistance
of his child. The duty to maintain and protect it is a principle
of natural law. He may even justify an assault and battery in
the defence of his children, and uphold them in their lawsuits.
Thus the law recognises the power of parental affections, and
excuses acts, which,.in the absence of such a relation, would be
punished. Another branch of parental duty, strongly inculcated
by writers on natural law, is the education of children. To aid
in the performance of these duties, and enforce obedience, parents
have authority over them, The municipal law should not disturb
this relation, except for the strongest reasons. The ease with
which it may be disrupted under the laws in question, the slight
evidence required, and the informal mode of procedure, make
them conflict with the natural right of the parent. Before any
abridgment of the right, gross misconduct, or almost total unfitness, on the part of the parent, should be clearly proved. This
power is an emanation from God, and every attempt to infringe
upon it, except from dire necessity, should be resisted, in all well
governed states. In this country, the hopes of the child, in
respect to its education, and future advancement, are mainly dependent upon the father; for this he struggles and toils through
life; the desire of its accomplishment operating as one of the
most powerful incentives to industry and thrift. The violent
abruption of this relation would not only tend to wither these
motives to action, but necessarily in time, alienate the father's
natural affections.
But even the power of the parent must be exercised with
moderation. He may use correction and restraint, but in a
reasonable manner. He has the right to enforce only such discipline as may be necessary to the discharge of his sacred trust,
only moderate correction and temporary confinement. We are
not governed by the twelve tables, which formed the Roman law.
The fourth table gave fathers the power of life and death and of
sale over their children.
In this age and country, such provisions would be atrocious.
VoL. XIX.-24
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If a father confined or imprisoned his child, for one year, the
majesty of the law would frown upon the unnatural act, and every
tender mother and kind father would rise up in arrms, against
such monstrous inhumanity.
Can the state, as paren8 patrie, exceed the power of the
natural parent, except in punishing crime? These laws provide
for the "safe keeping" of the child; they direct his "commit ment," and only a "ticket of leave,"Lor the uncontrolled discretion of a board of guardians, will permit the imprisoned boy,
to breathe the pure air of heaven, outside his prison walls, and to
feel the instincts of manhood, by contact with the busy world.
The mittimue terms him "a proper subject for commitment,"
directs the superintendent to "take his body," and the sheriff
endorses upon it, "executed by delivering the body of the within
named prisoner." The confinement may be from one to fifteen'
years, according to the age of the child. Executive clemency
cannot open prison doors, for no offence has been committed.
The writ of habeas corpus, a writ for the security of liberty, can
afford no relief, for the sovereign power of the state, as parens
patrim, has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such
a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression.
If, without crime, without the conviction of any offence, the
children of the state are to be thus confined, for the "good of
society," then society had better be reduced to its original
elements, and free government acknowledged a failure. In cases
of writs of habeas corpus to bring up infants, there are other
rights beside the rights of the father. If improperly or illegally
restrained, it is our duty ex debito justitie to liberate. The welfare and rights of the child are also to be considered. The disability of minors does not make slaves or criminals of them. They
are entitled to legal rights, and are under legal liabilities. An
implied contract for necessaries is binding on them. The only
act, which they are under a legal incapacity to perform, is the
appointment of an attorney. All their other acts are merely
voidable or confirmable. They are liable for torts, and punishable
for crime. Lord KENYON said, " If an infant commit an assault,
or utter slander, God forbid that he should not be answerable for
it, in a court of justice." Every child over ten years of age may
be found guilty of crime. For robbery, burglary, or arson any
minor may be sent to the penitentiary. Minors are bound to pay
taxes for the support of the government, and constitute a part
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of the militia, and are compelled to endure the hardships and
privations of a soldier's life in defence of the constitution and the
laws, and yet it is assumed that to them liberty is a mere chimera.
It is something of which they may have dreamed, but have never
enjoyed the fruition. Can we hold children responsible for
crime; liable for their torts; impose onerous burdens upon them,
and yet deprive them of the enjoyment of liberty without charge
or conviction of crime? The bill of rights declares that "all men
are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness."
This language is not restrictive, it is broad and .omprehensive,
and declares a grand truth that "all men"-all people everywhere,
have the inherent and inalienable right to liberty. Shall we say
to the children of the state, you shall not enjoy this right, a
right independent of all human laws and regulations? It is declared in the constitution, is higher than constitution and law,
and should be held for ever sacred.
Even criminals cannot be convicted and imprisoned without
due process of law-without a regular trial according to the
course of the common law. Why should minors be imprisoned
for misfortune? Destitution of proper parental care, ignorance,
idleness, and vice are misfortunes-not crimes. In all criminal
prosecutions against minors for grave and heinous offences, they
have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation,
and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. All this must
precede the final commitment to prison. Why should children,
only guilty of misfortune, be deprived of liberty without "due
process of law ?" It cannot be said that in this case there is no
imprisonment. This boy is deprived of a father's care, bereft of
home influences, has no freedom of action, is committed for an
uncertain time, is branded as a prisoner, made subject to the will
of others, and thus feels that he is a slave.
Nothing could more contribute to paralyze the youthful energies, crush all noble aspirations, and unfit him for the duties of
manhood. Other means of a milder character, other influences
of a more kindly nature, other laws less in restraint of liberty,
would better accomplish the reformation of the depraved, and
infringe less upon inalienable rights.
It is a grave responsibility to pronounce upon the acts of the
legislative department. It is however the solemn duty of the
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court to adjudge the law, and guard, when assailed, the liberty of
the citizen. The constitution is the highest law; it commands
and protects all. Its declaration of rights is an express limitation
of legislative power, and as the laws under which the detention
is had, are in conflict with its provisions, we must so declare.
It is therefore ordered that Daniel O'Connel be discharged
from custody.
We fear both the profession, and the
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois,
may justly conclude that we are in our
annotations devoting an unusual and
unequal proportion of space to cases
decided by that court. But we think no
apology will be demanded on account of
the publication of the case to which this
note is appended. Unless we have
greatly misconceived its scope and principles, it must be regarded as striking at
the very root and life of one of the most
favorite schemes of reform known to the
present age; what is called in popular
language, legislative moral reform and
compulsory popular education. These are
the foundation stones upon which a very
large and influential portion of our
people propose to erect an empire, superior both in character and power to any
other, ancient or modern. These two cardinal principles, legislative moral reform
and compulsory popular education, embrace both the religious and political eleitent of all the best class, pecuniarily at
least, of modern reformers. Whether in
the long run, they will be able to maintain
their ground, against all opposing elements, is a question of very difficult
solution. This class of reformers will
he likely, and as it seems to us, will be
fairly entitled, to regard this case as a
test one, striking a fatal blow at the very
foundation of their entire superstructure.
For, if education and moral reform
cannot have the compulsory aid of
government, the nature of man is so
lethargic, and so much prone to evil, on
the most favorable view, that these reformers will have small hope of ever

being able to mould so vast an empire
as this, composed of such diverse nationalities, and such discordant religious
and political opinions, into one homogeneous compound of purity and perfection, which these men greatly desire. It
is the strong arm of the civil law which
these men have been so long invoking;
and which they seemed, before this decision, so near attaining. We may not
correctly estimate the true scope of this
decision, but if we do, it inrolves all
we have said, and much more.
We know there is a highly cnltured
and powerful class in our community,
both in point of numbers and position,
who have no views or feelings in common with the class of reformers just
alluded to. This latter class do not
hold, that the mere text-book training
of the entire mass of the community from
four years old and upwards, has any
necessary tendency to produce either
wisdom or virtue; but rather the contrary, in vain conceit and imperfect
comprehension; and the attempt in all
classes to handle things which are too
high for them. And above all, this
latter class hold, that all hopeful and
reliable moral reforms must be looked
for only in a high degree of religious
faith and culture, from earliest infancy;
and that this cannot be expected to come
from the common schools, or the reform
schools, or any other schools; but exclusively or mainly from family training,
and from the authoritative teaching of
the church and her ministers, in the
daily discipline of a devout and holy
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These two schools are becoming, in
our country, year by year, more and
more antagonistic; and this decision
projects a fatal shaft, which has entered
between the very joints of the harness
of the most impregnable armor of the
one first named ; and so far as we can
comprehend it, must, if maintainable,
penetrate into the most vital parts of its
most indispensable machinery. For if
there is living power enough in those
abstractions of the state constitutions,
which have heretofore been regarded as
mere "glittering generalities," to enable the courts to enforce them, against
the enactments of the legislature, and
thus declare that all men are not only
created free and equal, but remain so,
and may enjoy life and pursue happiness
in their own way, provided they do not
interfere with the freedom of other men
in the pursuit of the same objects ; then
the opportunity to compel parents to
send their children to the common
schools, by means of "Truant Laws,"
such as we have in the highly advanced
commonwealth of Massachusetts, will
come to a speedy and most inglorious
termination. Under this decision such
advanced announcements as the following from a Boston daily paper, will
lose their interest and brilliancy, and be
more a cause of shame than of pride. '
We have no disposition and no space
here to enter into any extended discussion of the abstract right of government
to compel all parents to submit their
children to such education as the state
judges most useful and necessary to
make good citizens ; or to compel such
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parents to keep their children employed
so as not to come within the terms of the
charter of the city of Chicago, "as
being destitute of proper parental care,
and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness, or vice." It seems by
this statute, that if any child between
6iue ages of six and sixteen years, comes
within any one of these offences, he
thereby forfeits his liberty, his home,
and all the comforts of life, and becomes
subject to an imprisonment of not exceeding fifteen years in a Reform school,
which is indeed but another name for
the Penitentiary. The mode of trial,
too, certainly did not come within the
rules of the great English charter of the
liberty of the subject. There was no
indictment, no formal information, no
jury, no trial, and nothing indeed but
the sentence, which must be regarded
as highly summary.
We have read this decision with great
admiration. There can be no question, it
is a very creditable advance in favor of
liberty, among the children of white parents, as well as those of a more sombre
hue. All classes of men, and women too,
under this decision, may keep their own
children at home, and educate them in
their own way. This is a very wonderful advance in the way of liberty. It
must certainly be a great comfort to a
devout Roman Catholic father or mother,
to reflect, that now his child cannot be
driven into a Protestant school, and
made to read the Protestant version of the
Holy Scriptures. And what is more,
his or her child cannot be torn from
home and immured in a Protestant

I " Cxcax MATTZMS.-Chelsea appears to be ahead as regards compulsory education. A special
truant officer was appointed by the Mayor a few days since. Last week the pupils of the public
schools were directed by the teachers to give their names and residences to the officer. On Thursday the School Committee adopted an order providing that when any pupil shall without satisfactory
excuse absent himself from school six half-days any one term, the teacher shall report him to the
truant officer, who shall take him Into custody and bring him before a member or members of the
School Committee."
This certainly seems to partake very largely of the military educational system of the Prussian
empire, and to the common mind evinces very little of the inalienable right to the enjoyment of
life, and the unfettered pursuit of happiness.
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prison, for ten or more years, and
trained in what he regards a heretical
and deadly faith, to the destruction of
his own said. This is right; and we
hope the court will be able to maintain
this noble stand upon first principles.
But how will these reformers view it?
Will they tamely submit to be shorn
of all their glory by the judiciary?
These reformers swear, as we had supposed, mainly by the omnipotence of the
legislature; and so long as they have
that in their own power there is no
embarrassment in the way of their
advancement.
They can teach their
own children at home, or in private
schools ; but the common schools are
for the children of the poor; and the
Reform schools for those without proper
parental control.
Now we fear that
these men will ask the Supreme Court
of Illinois some questions in regard to
the right of the state to maintain schools,
and to compel children to submit to be
schooled therein, that it will be somewhat embarrassing to answer in a manner satisfactory to the interrogators.
We have no evil will towards reformers of any class. The love of reform
comes always from the best of purposes;
from a desire to have others participate
in the beauty and excellence which we
have found for ourselves. But we cannot disguise the fact, as we look back,
across the dark tract of the ages, that reformers, in all times and in all countries,
invoke the aid of force and compulsion,
in some form. They sincerely believe
themselves entitled to exercise the strong
arm of the law, in order to bring about
some greater good, or in some shorter
period, than could otherwise be accomplished. The time for the resort to the
fagot or the gibbet, or the rack or the
wheel, has indeed passed away; at which
all rejoice. But in doing so, we are in
danger of forgetting, that those who
invented and exercised these engines
of reform were animated by the same

spirit as ourselves-the doing of good
to those who were too ignorant or
too perverse willingly to accept their
highest good at our hands. And in
all times the subjects of such compulsory reforms are prone to regard
the reformers in too offensive a light,
and to give them the undeserved name
of priests or puritans, or some other
offensive epithet.
But we believe the reformers of all
ages have been mainly well intentioned
men, who had the highest good of the
greatest number deeply at heart. We
cannot believe that the Holy Inquisition,
or the fires of Smithfield and Oxford, in
our own mother country, with all their
loathsome horrors, proceeded mainly
from the love of oppression or of vengeance. And we are disposed to accept
the same charitable construction in regard
to the compulsory attendance upon the
common schools, and the compulsory
reading of the Protestant Bible in such
schools, and especially in regard to these
Reform schools, which are springing up
in every section of our widely extended
country.
We do not indeed suppose that the
persons mainly instrumental in getting
up these things in the country really
intend them for their own children, or
indeed in the present case for the children
of Protestant parents, to any large extent. We cannot disguise to ourselves
that these things do have an ominous
squint towards the children of Roman
Catholic parents, and of the multitudes
of poor emigrants yearly coming'to our
shores, most of whom are of that faith.
We cannot but feel that the real animus
of these enactments is but poorly disguised under the general terms adopted ;
just as we should say of any similar
provisions now adopted by state legislatures at the South, especially when done
in defiance of the authority of the national
government. All would exclaim that
it was a mere cloak for the reinstating
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of slavery for a limited term among tiie
And the same is true of all restrictive
children of the colored population. M
'e legislation of the character of compulsory
all very properly look to the naturi?d education
or reforms of any kind, they
overation of such provisions, and tIhe look
very plausible, on the outside,
persons they will naturally reach, n inasmuch as they profess
to cure ignoorder to determine 'the motive of tho se rance, idleness
and vice-infirmities and
who introduce them. There is nothin
g evils highly detrimental always, and in
unequal or unjust in this construction o
f certain proportions of combination in
such enactments. And if this were thei.r the
elements of public life, destructive
only purpose there could be no questio:
a of the common welfare. In this latter
they deserve the treatment they riceiv
e view there can be no question of the
in the principal case. Reform school s
right to apply such legislative remedy
or common schools for the leading pur
or even punishment as the nature of the
pose of training Roman Catholic childrei
n case may demand. But the mere reform
in the fundamental principles of Protest - and
advancement of the citizen in virtue
antism by compulsion, so far as thi
or learning, except as an incident of
compulsion is concerned, surely coulcI punishment for crime, cannot, in
free
not be defended upon any principles of government,
be made a leading object
jurisprudence'known to free countries. * of compulsory legislative
discipline.
But there is a secondary purpose upon And
this case seems to us to come very
which a large portion of the most agi-- nearly upon the exact
line of demarcatating, if not the most dangerous and tion between
these two widely divergent
offensive legislation of the country fields
of employment.
We rejoice
is sought to be rendered acceptable to greatly,
as we believe all true friends
the people, and thus maintained in order
of liberty and constitutional government
to enable it to accomplish some great will, at this demonstration
of the highest
good as'it were by indirection. This
judicial tribunal of one of the great
mode of doing good even, is always
northwestern states, in what we cannot
ofiensive and never to be vindicated
but regard as the right direction. We
except upon the clearest certainty, that
bid them God speed in a great and good
it really is indispensable to the accomwork ; but one of great delicacy and
plishment of some great necessity for difficulty.
The particular case seems
the public good. Interested parties will
to be measurably free from doubt. But
always see this great public good with
there is a wide field of debatable ground
great clearness of vision and will refuse between
the dominion of punishment
to accept the conviction of any of the
for crime and that of mere improved
alleged evil consequences. And as the
culture, in which it will be long before
good is often certain and the evil only
any very exact definitions of jurisdiction
conjectural, such legislation has much or of the distributions
of service between
to commend it, and especially to those
the voluntary and the compulsory fields
who feel reasonably sure they can them- can be satisfactorily
fixed. In the mean
selves contrive to keep clear of all injury time the present
decision cannot but be
and possibly compass some good by
regarded as a salutary warning and
means of it. It is thus that many buradmonition to those reformers, who
densome restrictions upon trade come to believe
the legislative authority abunbe endured for the sake of some fancied dant
to compel every citizen to accept
general benefit, and a sure private and par- their own faith and
practice-for the best
ticular benefit in tlte shape of monopoly or
of all reasons-that nothing could be so
some other form to the few, who are most
healthful for his soul's most salutary
active in getting up such schemes.
discipline.
I. F. R.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
THE STATE v. ALDEN LITCHFIELD.
Telegraphic communications are not privileged, and a telegraphic operator is
bound to testify to the contents of a message, if it be material and relevant.
A jury may convict on the unsupported testimony of an accomplice.

THIS was an indictment for robbery. At the trial objection
was made by the prisoner to the admission of a telegraphic
operator to testify to the delivery of a message to the prisoner
and to its contents, and the objection being overruled, exception
was taken by the prisoner to the ruling on that point, and also to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
A. S. Bice, for the state.

A. C. Jewett, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, C. J.-The main question presented for our determination is whether a telegraphic operator is bound to testify
to the contents of a telegraphic message.
The case finds the message material to the issue. A verbal
message communicated to the prisoner would be admissible, and
the party communicating it would be compelled to state it. So
a written message, or its contents, after due notice to produce the
original and a failure of its production by the party notified,
would be received in evidence. The mode of transmission to
the person delivering the message, whether by telegraph or otherwise, has nothing to do with the matter. The important inquiry
relates to its materiality.
Nor can telegraphic communications be deemed any more
confidential than any other communications. Telegraphic communications are not to be protected to aid the robber or assassin
in the consummation of their felonies, or to facilitate their escape
after the crime has been committed. No communication should
be excluded, no individual .should be exempt from inquiry, when
the communication, or the answer to the inquiry, would be of
importance in the conviction of crime or the acquittal of innocence, except when such exclusion is required by some grave
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principle of public policy. The honest man asks for no confidential communications, for the withholding the same cannot
benefit him. The criminal has no right to demand exclusion of
evidence because it would establish his guilt. The telegraphic
companies cannot rightfully claim that the messages of rogues
and criminals, which they may innocently or ignorantly transmit
should be withheld, whenever the cause of justice renders their
production necessary. They cannot wish their servants should,
however innocently, co-operate in the commission of crime and
decline to co-operate in its detection, and punishment and thus
become its accomplices. The intere.ts of the public demand
that resort should be had to all available testimony, which may
lead to the detection and punishment of crime and to the protection of innocence. The telegraphic operator, as such, can claim
no exemption from interrogation. Like other witnesses, he is
bound to answer all inquiries material to the issue.
The notice to produce was seasonably given in accordance with
the 27th Rule of this Court (37 Maine 576). It was before the
trial commenced. The rule does not require the notice to be
given before the commencement of the term.
The degree of credit to be given to an accomplice was submitted to the jury with proper instructions. There is no rule of
law that they may not convict upon such testimony. There
should be none such. The degree of credit to be given to a witness,
whatever may be his character or position in a cause, should not
be arbitrarily determined in advance of his testimony and in
ignorance of the circumstance affecting its credibility.
The telegraphic operator testified to receiving the telegram in
question, and that she had a faint recollection of delivering it to
the defendant. She had some recollection on the subject. The
evidence therefore was proper for the jury, and it was for them
to consider how far and to what extent it would be safe, under all
the circumstances of the case, to rely on her memory.
Exceptions overruled.
KENT, WALTON, IARROWS, and DANFORTH, JJ., concurred.
The foregoing opinion we intended to
have published at an earlier day, but it
was accidentally mislaid. It covers a
very important question. There is, we
apprehend, some misconception in regard

to the right of the government to possess
themselves of what would otherwise be
held inviolably secret, in private correspondence. The question involved in this
case has no very close analogy to the
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confidence which the law recognises
between counsel or attorney and client.
That rests upon the necessities of the fair
and just administration of justice. If
it were not for that it would be impossible for counsel to be so far possessed
of the real facts in causes as to be able to
give safe counsel or to render proper
assistance to the court in presenting
them. This is a rule of policy established, partly no doubt for the protection
of the client ; but largely for the protection of justice and the convenience
of its administration. And the same
is true in regard to the inviolability of
the secrets of the grand-jury room. It
is a rule of state policy, and one which,
at present, has no great importance
attached to it, certainly not in free
governments and quiet times.
But the rule, in regard to the inviolability of correspondence by telegraph,
is one mainly resting upon an honorary
understanding between the companies
or their servants and their employees.
It is not in any proper sense a perfect
or legal duty or obligation. It certainly
could not be made the basis of an action
in court, that the operators on a telegraph line had made the messages public,
unless some pecuniary loss ensued to the
parties sending or receiving the same.
And we should not be prepared to say,
that even in case of actual loss by such
exposure of the contents of messages by
telegraph, the company would incur any
pecuniary liability, upon the ground of
general implied duty to keep such messages secret. We doubt whether any
such general duty attaches to the undertaking of the company consequent upon
a message being left for transmission in
the general way, where nothing in particular is said in that respect and no
statutory duty exists. Possibly where
a special request is made, and a special undertaking to keep secret is assumed, an action might lie for breach of
the undertaking and consequent loss.

But even in such cases, no one could
fairly claim that such message could be
withheld from the state, in the prosecution of crime, or from the courts in the
pursuit of truth. There is in many
relations a duty to keep secrets. That
exists between all owners of business
and those employed in its prosecution.
There will always be many secrets in
business, which it is lawful and proper
for the owner to keep. If they pertain
to the manufacture of articles offered
for sale, they are often of great value,
and the law will protect them and not
allow one who comes by them in a confidential manner to make any improper
use of them: Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452. And there is an imperfect
or honorary duty upon all subordinate
members of a private household or family, or of any office or place of business,
whatever, not to divulge anything coming within their knowledge, to the
detriment of those with whom they are
associated. And even in courts of
justice such confidential matters will
not be drawn from witnesses unless to
answer some substantial requirement,
or necessity of justice. But where such
an exigency does arise, of which the
court must judge, there is no such inviolability in any of these obligations to
secrecy as will shield a witness from
giving testimony.
And the duty of a telegraph operator
cannot be regarded as of an essentially
different character. It is one resting
upon custom, or contract, more than anything else, and while it is very proper
that it should protect correspondence
from all impertinent and meddling curiosity, and especially from interested
persons, in a counter direction, whether
such interest be of a pecuniary or any
other character, there seems no ground
upon which it can be fairly claimed to
extend to investigations in courts of
justice.

MANCHESTER v. HOTCHKISS.
In Pennsylvania, by the Act of 14th
April 1851, it is made a misdemeanor
for any person connected with any line
of telegraph to use or make known
the contents of a despatch without the
consent or direction either of the party
sending or the party receiving it. In
Henislerv. Freedman, 2 Parsons 274, it
was held that this act did not apply to
cases where such disclosure should be-

come material on a trial in a court of
justice. And by subsequent statute
(8th May 1855) it is made the duty of
telegraph companies to preserve the
originals of all messages (other than
those intended for publication) for at
least three years, and to produce them
in evidence when properly subpoenaed.
I. F. R.

United States District Court, District of R)hode Island.
MANCHESTER- ET

AL. V.

HOTCHKISS.1

A service of a libel in a proceeding in personam on a maritime contract, against
a citizen of another district by attachment of his property, is a good service and
the court obtains jurisdiction.
A defendant does not waive his right to1 object to the jurisdiction of the court in
an admiralty proceeding by filing a stipulation for costs and to abide the decree
of the court, &c., under Rule 4 in Admiralty.

THIS was a libel in admiralty by Manchester et al., citizens of
The district of Rhode Island, against Hotchkiss, a citizen of the
district of Connecticut.

The marshal returned that for want of

the body of the within-named George Hotchkiss, to be by him
found within this district, he had on March 8th 1871, attached
all the right, title, and interest that the said George Hotchkiss
had in and to the schooner George Hotchkiss.

The respondent on March 10th entered a claim to the schooner,
and on the same day he also filed a stipulation for costs, together
with a stipulation in conformity with the fourth rule in Admiralty,
-whereupon the schooner was surrendered to him, and the attachment dissolved by operation of law.
On the return-day of the writ the respondent filed a plea and
answer, to which libellants replied.

Browne

Fanslyck, for libellants.

A. Payne and J. C. Pegram, for respondents.

I See post p.

383.
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KNowLEs, D. J.-The respondent in his plea and answer, in
the first place avers and insists that the court has no jurisdiction
of the cause, because the defendant is not, nor was he at the filing
of the libel, a citizen or resident of the district of Rhode Island,
and the only service ever made of said libel was by attaching the
goods and chattels of the defendant within the district of Rhode
Island, the paragraph closing with these words: "Saving and
reserving all benefit and advantage from said plea, and if overruled, the said defendant makes answer to said libel, and alleges
and articulately propounds," &c., &c.
To this the libellants reply, " that the respondent's plea to the
jurisdiction of the court ought not to be received and accredited,
because, before the offering of said plea, said defendant had
submitted himself and the cause to the jurisdiction of the court,
by entering into and filing in the clerk's office of the court his
stipulation to abide by and perform all the decree of the court
in said cause, and had submitted himself and'his cause to the
jurisdiction of the court by filing an answer in said cause to the
merits thereof." And to this the libellants further replying, add
that the plea is bad and insufficient in law.
In passing upon one of the two questions here presented, it
seems necessary to say but little. Conceding that a defendant
may waive a personal privilege, and estop himself from denying
the jurisdiction of a Court of Admiralty, it still is incumbent on
a libellant to show satisfactorily that a waiver was made by the
defendant. This is not shown in this case. The filing of a
stipulation, in order to release the vessel from attachment, I
cannot regard as a waiver of any right or ground of defence to
the suit; and as in this "answer and plea," filed on the returnday of the writ, the day when, and not prior to which, he-was
entitled and bound to appear in court and answer, he sets forth
his objections to the jurisdiction, I am constrained to adjudge
that objection seasonably presented: The Bee, Ware 832. In
neither text book nor reported case do I find aught inconsistent
with this ruling.
In regard to the other of the two questions, though much might
properly be said, were it now for the first time presented for
judicial action, little, as it seems to me, needs be said in this
connection.
That question, it must be agreed, in its last analysis, is simply
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this i Is a libel suit in personam in Admiralty a "1civil suit"
within the meaning of the 11th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 ? (1 Stat. at L. 78).
Now, to this question distinctly raised, a negative answer was
given in 1867, in an elaborate and exhaustive opinion by Judge
BENEDICT, of the Eastern District of New York,-1 Benedict 118
-and an affirmative answer was recently given by Judge SHERMAN, of the Northern District of Ohio, in an opinion not less elaborate.' There is reason to believe, too, that by the late Justice
McLEAN, of Ohio, by Judge HOFFMAN, of California, by Judge
SHIPMAN, of Connecticut, and by Judge WOODRUFF, 2 of the

second circuit (overruling the decision in 1 Benedict), opinions
in harmony with that of Justice SHERMAN have been delivered

within the twenty years past. Of these six opinions, however,
I have as yet been able to find only those of Judges BENEDICT
and SHERMAN; but in these, I incline to believe, will be found
embodied all the leading arguments and suggestions which give
countenance to the conclusions to which, after full argument and
deliberation, they respectively arrived. The weight of authority,
numerically considered, it is seen, is in favor of the affirmative
conclusion.
But this, it is contended on behalf of the libellant, is not to be
allowed to control my judgment. There are, it is argued, other
facts to be considered: 1. That the Admiralty Rules Nos. 2, 3,
and 4, framed by the Supreme Court, are consistent only with
the rulings of Judge BENEDICT, and are "1without law and against
law," if his construction of the statute of 1789 be not sound. 2.
That in all the text-books and manuals of admiralty practice
now in daily use by the profession, a service of a writ in admiralty
by attachment of goods and chattels merely, irrespective of the
residence or presence of the defendant, is treated and prescribed
as a legal and sufficient service. 8. That throughout the United
States, save in the Districts of California, Ohio, Connecticut, and
New York, a service by attachment only (irrespective of a defendant's residence) is held to be valid and effectual; and, 4.
That from 1789 down to 1852, so far as can be learned, not even
an intimation that such a service was objectionable or questionable,
was ever heard from bench or bar; that as early as 1841 (1 Story
I Reported, post, p. 383.

2 Reported, post, p. 389.
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531), Justice

STORY, in his opinion in a Rhode Island cause, said,
in ruling upon a cognate question: "Neither has it been doubted
that the process of attachment well lies in an admiralty suit against
the property of private persons, whose property is found within
the district, although their persons may not be found therein, as
well to enforce their appearance to the suit, as to apply it in
satisfaction of the decree rendered in the suit. Ever since the
elaborate examination (in 1825) of the whole subject in the case
of Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473, this question has been
deemed entirely at rest." And that in harmony with this dictum
of Justice STORY, as a declaration of settled law, has ever been
the practice and usage throughout the circuit, whoever at the
bar, whoever upon the bench.
To the force of the libellant's reasoning on this point, I am
constrained to yield. No decision of the 1Supreme Court or of the
circuit judge of this district, in support of the defendant's plea
to jurisdiction is produced, while dicta, if such merely they be,
both from the 10th Wheaton and 1st Story are produced, impliedly
overruling such a plea. I find a practice and usage established
in this district, in harmony with the dicta of judges to whose
opinions I should be bound to defer, and in harmony with rules
ordained by the Supreme Court, to which the force of statutes
is universally conceded. If this practice and usage is to be
abandoned as grounded on a misconception on the part of practitioners, text-writers and judges, of a statute enacted in 1789,
and still in force, I prefer that the decree to that effecft shall
issue from the Supreme or the Circuit Court rather than from
this.
A sufficient ground for a judgment overruling the defendant's
"exceptive plea" is found in the usage and practice in this circuit
from 1789 downwards, and in the acts and declarations of its
judges under the Rules in Admiralty to which I have referred,
framed by the Supreme Court, in 1842, and yet in full force.
Such a ground, moreover, I do not hesitate to add is found in the
opinion of Judge BENEDICT in the case cited. That opinion, it
is said, has been overruled by the learned judge of the Second
Circuit (WOODRUFF), and as we have seen, in certain districts, the
adverse doctrine has been promulgated from the bench; but until
better informed than I at present am as to the reasons assigned
for dissenting from the conclusions of Judge BENEDICT, I am
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inclined to concur in and adopt those conclusions-especially
these : says Judge BENEDICT:"When the District Courts were constituted Courts of Admiralty, they acquired the right to those methods and modes of
proceeding which are the life of the admiralty, and among which
has from the first been the power to seize property of defendants
who cannot be found and to compel an appearance. This power
is recognised by the admiralty rules as existing in these courts;
it has never been conferred upon any other tribunal, and any
intention to place it in abeyance, or to limit its exercise, when
entertained by the law-making power, will, it may well be supposed, be clearly expressed, and not left to be inferred from the
use of a general and indefinite phrase. * * *'If either from
changes in the habits of commerce, or from modifications which
are found necessary and become fixed in the practice of-Admiralty
Courts of other countries, or from changes in the spirit of our
institutions, a limitation of the mode of exercising this power
shall become necessary or proper, it is not to be doubted that the
Supreme Court, as the high appellate Court of Admiralty, and
as empowered by the Act of 1842, will effect a change in this
paiticular, as it most properly did in regard to the power of
imprisonment."
The defendants' "exceptive allegation or plea" to the jurisdiction of the court is overruled, and the case will stand for hearing
upon its merits.

United States .DistrictCourt, Northern District of Ohio.
N. E. INSURANCE CO. v. DETROIT AND CLEVELAND STEAM
NAVIGATION CO.'
Service of a libel in personant in a maritime cause, in the admiralty court of
one district, upon a citizen of another district by attachment of his property, is
not a good service and confers no jurisdiction.
THIS was a libel inper8onam filed to recover damages caused
by the collision of the steamboat Morning Star and the bark
Cortlandt, on Lake Erie. The defendant was a corporation
under the law of Michigan, having its business office at Detroit,
and running a line of steamers from that port to Cleveland.

ISee

ante, p. 379, and post, p. 389.
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The usual process was issued from this court and returned by
the marshal, that the respondents were not found, and that he
had attached one of their steamboats lying in the harbor of
Cleveland.
Under a stipulation entered into by the parties, both a plea to
the jurisdiction and an answer to the merits were filed.
Willey 4"Cary, for libelants.
Hibbard and foore, for respondents.
SHERMAN, D. J.-On the part of the respondents it is insisted
that this court has no jurisdiction of the cause, because the respondent was not an inhabitant of the Northern District of Ohio,
nor found therein, but was an inhabitant of the Eastern District
of Michigan.
The libellants claim that it is according to the long and well
established practice of courts of admiralty to proceed against a
respondent by attachment of his goods, if he cannot be found
within the jurisdiction of the court to be served with process;
that when Congress, by the Act of 1789, established courts of
admiralty, and gave them "1cognisance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and provided that the
forms and modes of proceedings in causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction shall be according to the course of the civil
law, they sanctioned the usual modes of obtaining jurisdiction
for the recovery of a demand, which is in its nature cognisable
in those courts; that this is confirmed by the Act of Congress
passed May 2d 1792, and also by the Act of August 23d 1842,
and by the authority of these statutes the Supreme Court provided by Rule No. 2 in Admiralty for the issuing and service of
mesne process, in suits in personam, by virtue of which the process in this case was issued.
The case, therefore, presents the important question whether
a court of admiralty can obtain jurisdiction of an inhabitant of
another district, in a maritime cause, by an attachment of his
property. The question is not affected by the fact that the
respondents are a corporation. For the purposes of this case, a
corporation must be deemed an inhabitant of the state in which
it is created and doing business, and it is as clearly within the reason
of the rule, regulating jurisdiction over inhabitants, as a natural
person. I, therefore, treat the question precisely as I should if
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the respondent was a natural person, an inhabitant of the state
of Michigan, sued in the Northern District of Ohio by attachment
of his property, and not found, nor served with process.
In addition to the statutes above named, the libellants cite in
support of their position the case of Aanro v. Almeida, 10
Wheat. 173, and a number of other cases founded upon that decision. As that was the only case upon which the question appears
to be raised and passed upon in the Supreme Court, and as the
decision of that court is conclusive upon me, if applicable to this
case, it is proper for me to examine it and ascertain the precise
extent of the decision.
The libel was filed in the District of Maryland against Almeida,
charging him with having committed a tort on board of a certain
vessel off the capes of the Chesapeake, taking therefrom $5000
in specie and converting it to his own use. It appears from the
statement of the case that Almeida resided in the District of
Maryland, but had absconded therefrom and fled beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, and that the libellant had no means of
redress except by process of attachment against his goods within
the district. The goods were attached by the marshal, and a
copy of the monition was left at the late dwelling of Almeida.
Upon demurrer to the libel the case came to the Supreme Court
and was there decided. The decision establishes the general
principle that in a suit in personam against a former inhabitant
of the district who had absconded or concealed himself, that the
District Court, as a court of admiralty, had power to issue
process of attachment to compel his appearance. Other cases
cited by the libellants support and confirm this principle, and
some of them extend it to cases against aliens not found in the
district, but having property there, which can be attached.
These cases all affirm the doctrine that courts of admiralty always
possessed the power to issue process of attachment and still maintained and asserted it, as a means to compel absent respondents,
under certain circumstances, to appear and answer. But these
decisions are not applicable to the case before me. These respondents claim that being in a legal* sense, inhabitants of the state
of Michigan, they could not be sued in the Northern District of
Ohio by process of attachment and seizure of their property.
That they were not alien non-residents, nor were they ever
inhabitants of this district, and had not absconded or concealed'
VOL. XIX.=-25
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themselves, and were therefore not within the rules laid down in
those cases.
The question then recurs upon the provisions of the Acts of
Congress and the 2d rule in Admiralty.
The Judiciary Act of September 1789, establishing the judicial
tribunals, defines their location, distributes and limits their jurisdiction and the manner of its exercise. The first eight- sections
provide for the organization of the Supreme, Circuit, and District
Courts, the division of the country into circuits and disticts, and
appointments of clerks and other officers. The ninth section
defines the jurisdiction of the District Courts. First, of certain
"crimes and offences ;" next, they shall have exclusive original
cognisance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction including seizure under laws of import as well as seizure
on land and all suits for penalties and forfeitures under the laws
of the United States, and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Circuit Courts, when an alien sues for a tort, and also suits
against consuls, &c.
The eleventh section defines the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts, and provides that they shall have original cognisance of
all suits of a civil nature in common law or equity, when the sum
exceeds $500, and the United States or an alien is a party, or
the suit is between citizens of different states, and concurrent
jurisdiction with the District Courts of all crimes and offences
against the laws of the United States. Then follow in the same
section these two provisions:
"But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial
in another in any civil action before a Urcuit or District Court.
"And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said
courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any original
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,
or in which he may be found at the time of the serving of the
writ."
It may be added that the Constitution of the United States
provides that the trial of all crimes shall be held in the state and
district where the crime shall have been committed.
Tho object of these provisions is clear. It was to prevent
citizens of one state from being compelled to go to a distant
state to defend themselves from criminal prosecutions, or against
a civil suit. At the time of enactment of these provisions, Con-
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gress was in the very act of framing a judicial system, providing
for the organization of courts, to be held in each state, thus bringing the Federal court within reach of every citizen. As these
courts were acting, not under local authority, but derived their
powers from a government embracing the whole country, it might
well have been concluded that their powers were ample to send
process and compel the appearance of defendants residing in any
state, however remote. But, Congress, by the provisions of the
11th sect., prevented any such construction of their powers and
thereby prohibited any of the federal courts to issue process and
enforce the appearance of a citizen except in the district in
which he is an inhabitant or in which he may be found at the
time of the service of the writ.
That in actions at common law or in equity, a party cannot
proceed by attachment and so obtain jurisdiction of a person
who is an inhabitant of another district, is well settled. It is also
clear that the federal courts cannot send their process into another
district in suits at common law or in equity, and thereby obtain
jurisdiction of the person. I do not understand the libellant to controvert those propositions.
They are settled by
numerous authorities. Among them I cite: 5 Mason R. 35;
Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters 800; Ex parte Graham, 4 Wash.
R. 211; Day v. -NTewarkIndia .Rubber Co., 1 Blatchf. 628, which
applies the principle to a corporation created by the laws of
another state. If, then, this is a civil suit within the meaning
of the 11th section of the Judiciary Act, there is an end of the
question, and jurisdiction of the case cannot be acquired by attachment of property.
In the ninth and eleventh sections, conferring jurisdiction
upon the Circuit and District Courts, Congress had spoken of
"crimes and offences," "civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," "suits for penalties and forfeitures," "causes where
an alien sues for a tort," "suits against consuls," "suits of a
civil nature at common law and in equity," and declares that no
"civil suit" shall be brought, &c.
A "civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is
prosecuted by a suit. It is within the clause, as clearly as a
"cause where an alien sues for a tort." It is not necessary and
not usual in a statute to recite in a restrictive clause again the
several terms previously embraced in the same section. The
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suits that are recited are all civil in their nature. A cause in
admiralty is so expressly described-it is called a "civil cause."
The term " civil suit" was an apt and proper term, to describe
all these actions and causes of actions. The constitution provided that all criminal prosecutions should be tried in the district
where the crime was committed. Congress provided by this
section that civil suits should be placed in the same position, and
only be brought in the same district where the person sued was
an inhabitant. The intention was, in using the term " civil suit,"
to distinguish it from a criminal cause, and to give as full and
complete protection against suits brought against residents in
distant districts in the one case as in the other. The restriction,
therefore, made the judicial system and the jurisdiction of the
courts consistent and complete. This construction does not deny
the original and present powers of admiralty courts to issue the
process of attachment when the respondent is an alien non-resident, nor, when an inhabitant, he absconds or conceals himself;
but it restricts and prohibits such process to be issued when the
respondent is an actual inhabitant of another district.
The libellants further claim that the Acts of Congress of 1792
and 1842, regulating the practice of the courts, are in such
terms that they and the second rule of the Supreme Court
in admiralty, have modified the Judiciary Act of 1789, limiting
jurisdiction in this respect. In answer to this, it is sufficient to
say that the Supreme Court in Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters
800, expressly decided that these acts are not designed to alter
or enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts, but only to regulate
the exercise of jurisdiction where it exists.
It may be added that if these acts are held to authorize the
Supreme Court, by rule, to abrogate the restriction in the 11th
section of the Acts of 1789 in any respect, it cannot be confined
to the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty; for the Act of 1842
gives the same power touching proceedings at common law and
in equity, as in admiralty. If that construction is correct it
enables the Supreme Court to repeal, by rule, all the restrictions
contained in the Act of 1789, on this subject, and to authorize
common-law actions against the inhabitants of any state, to be
brought in any other district in the United States.
In support of these views the counsel for the respondents cite
the written opinion of Judge McLEAN, given in Chicago in 1860,
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v. Western Transportation Company, and
in the case of
not reported. The facts were substantially the same in that case
as in this, and he dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. His
opinion, until reversed, is the law of this circuit and should be
decisive of the question raised here.
The opinion of Judge WOODRUFF, the Circuit Judge of the
Second Circuit, in the late case of Atkins v. The Fibre .Dis-"
integrating Company (see infra), reversing the judgment of
Judge BENEDICT, as reported in 1 Benedict 118, takes the same
view of the question. The opinions of Judges McLEAN and
WOODRUFF embody many of the views I have suggested, and

very ably, I think, present the reasons and considerations pertinent to the subject, with the authorities.
I am compelled to concur with the conclusions of those judges,
and to hold that the jurisdiction of the defendants in this case
was not acquired by this court by the attachment. The plea to
the jurisdiction is sustained-the libel dismissed.

(Tnited States Ciruit Court, .Eastern District of .New York.'
JOSHUA ATKINS

ET

AL.,

APPELLEES, v.

THE FIBRE

DISINTEGRATING COMPANY, APPELLANT.
In a proceeding in personam on a maritime contract, in a court of admiralty of
one district against a citizen of another district, service by attachment of his property is not sufficient, and confers no jurisdiction.
For the purposes of such a question a corporation is to be held a citizen of the
state in which it is incorporated.
An entry on the record that " Mr. B. appears for respondent and has a week
to perfect an appearance and answer," does not show such an appearance as
amounts to a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction.

T.His was a libel for freight and demurrage. The libel concluded with a prayer for a decree "for the payment by the
respondents of the sum," &c.
On the return-day the marshal returned the process, respondents not found, and that he had attached all the property of the
respondents in their factory at Red Hook, in the city of Brook-

lyn. And on that day, the record stated, "Mr. Beebe appears
I See

ante pp. 379, 383.
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for respondent, and has a week to perfect appearance and to
answer."
Thereupon the respondents procured an order to show cause

why the property should not be discharged from the attachment,
or why such other order should not be made, as the court should
see fit to grant.
The affidavits, on the part of the respondents, showed that the
officers of the- respondents' corporation were within the jurisdiction, and that no effort was made by the marshal to find or serve
them.
The affidavits produced and filed by the libellants showed that
the respondents are a corporation incorporated by the laws of
the state of New Jersey, but having a manufactory and carrying on business in the eastern district of New York.
The motion being denied, the respondents answered, and the
court made a decree against them, on the merits (see 1 Benedict 118), from which decree this appeal was taken.
E.

. Benedict, for libellants.

Charles Donahue, for respondents.
WOODRUFF, Circuit Judge.-The appellant (respondent below)
insists that the District Court had no jurisdiction to proceed herein,
because such respondent was not an inhabitant of the eastern
district of New York, nor found therein. If the respondent is
right in this, it will be wholly unnecessary to consider any suestion arising on the merits, on the appeal of either party. But
the libellants insist that the respondent was not in a situation to
raise the objection, and that by appearance the objection was
waived. I think that in this the claim of the libellant has no
sufficient foundation. The record shows only this: that on the
return-day of the process " Mr. Beebe appears for the respondent,
and has a week to perfect an appearance and answer." This
ought not to be regarded as an appearance which operates as a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction and waiver of the objection.
No doubt that a general appearance and answer without objection is to be deemed a voluntary appearance, and is equivalent to
service of process within the district. But here the respondents
were allowed time to perfect an appearance, and immediately
moved to set aside the proceeding, and, that being denied by the
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court, they were compelled to answer, and did so by setting up
the objection. It was according to the ancient practice in
admiralty in cases of attachment not to recognise anything as an
appearance but putting in of bail, and a similar practice formerly
obtained in New York, in cases of attachments against foreign
corporations. Now, although special bail be not now required in
New York, it is obvious that neither party regarded an appearance
by the respondents as perfected, and the respondents stipulated
expressly that the subsequent bond for value should not operate
as a waiver of .their motion.
Upon the important question whether a court of admiralty in
one district can obtain jurisdiction to proceed against an inhabitant of another district by attachment of his goods, the opinion
of the district judge in this case shows some conflict of opinion.
The question is not affected by the circumstance that the
respondents are a corporation. For the purposes of the question,
a corporation must be deemed an inhabitant of the state in which
it is incorporated, and it is as clearly within the reason of the
rule, regulating jurisdiction over inhabitants, as a natural person.
I therefore treat the question precisely as I should if the
respondent was a natural person, an inhabitant of New Jersey,
sued in the Eastern District of New York, by attachment of his
goods, and not found nor served with process.
Had the District Court, sitting in admiralty, jurisdiction to
proceed in that manner against the respondent upon the cause of
action alleged?
The cause of action was maritime, and therefore it was a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. This is not questioned by the
respondents. Thereupon the libellants insist that it is according
to the long and well established practice of courts of admiralty
to proceed against a respondent by attachment of his goods if he
absconds from or cannot be found within the jurisdiction of the
court to be served with process. That when the Congress of the
United States established courts of admiralty and gave them
C cognisance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" (Act of September 24th 1789," to establish the judicial
courts of the United States," sect. 9. 1 Stat. 76), and provided
that the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of * * admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to the course
of the civil law (act to regulate process, &c., September 24th
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1789, sect. 2. 1 Stat. 93), they sanction this mode of obtaining
jurisdiction to proceed against a respondent, in personam, for
the recovery of a demand which is in its nature cognisable in
those courts.
That this is further confirmed by the act for regulating process,
passed May 8th 1792 (sect. 2. 1 Stat. 276), which provides
"that the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except
their style, and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits in
those of common law shall be the same as those now used in the
said courts respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled "An act
to regulate processes in courts of the United States ;" in those of
equity, and those of admiralty and maritimi jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts
of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law; except so far as may have
been providedfor by the act to establish the judicialcourts of the
United States, subject, however, to such alterations and additions
as the said courts, respectively, shall in their discretion deem
expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme Court of
the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule,
to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same."
That if the question were before doubtful no such doubt can
exist since the Act of 23d August, 1842 (5 Stat. 517), which by
section 6 gave to the Supreme Court of the United States full
power * * to prescribe and regulate and alter the forms of writs
and other process to be used in the district and circuit courts, and
the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers,
and other proceedings and pleadings in suits at common law or
in admiralty and in equity pending in said courts; * * * and
generally to regulate the whole practice of the said courts so as
to prevent delays and to promote brevity and succinctness in all
pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish all unnecessary
costs and expenses in any suit therein.
That by authority of the fnregoing statutes, the Supreme Court
have provided by rule that where the respondent to a libel filed
in admiralty cannot be found within the district, process may
issue against his property in such district, &c. (see 2d rule in
Admiralty).
The general proposition deducible from the statutes above
referred to was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
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States in the case of Manro et al. v. Almeida, in 1825 (10

Wheat. 473), and is not open for discussion in this court, viz.:
"The courts of the United States, proceeding as courts of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, may issue the process of
attachment to compel appearance in cases of maritime torts and
contracts." As this is the only case in which the question appears
to have been raised and passed upon in that court, and as the
decision of that court is conclusive upon me, it is important to
state what the case was in which the above general proposition is
held and to what precise extent the decision goes.
The libel was filed in the District of Maryland, charging Almeida with having committed a tort on board a certain vessel
off the capes of the Chesapeake, taking therefrom $5000 in specie
and converting it to his own use. It appears by the statement
of the case that Almeida resided in the district but had absconded
from the United States and fled beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, and the libel averred that the libellants had no means of
redress but by process of attachment against his goods, chattels,
and credits, which were also about to be removed by his orders
to foreign parts. The goods, &c., were attached by the marshal,
and a copy of the monition was left at the late dwelling-house
of Almeida, and a copy affixed at the public exchange and on
the mast of the vessel containing the attached goods, &c.
On demurrer to the libel, the questions decided were raised, and
from the decision, dismissing the libel, appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court and the decree was reversed.
The decision therefore affirms that it is within the power and
jurisdiction of the District Court as a court of admiralty to
issue process of attachment to -compel the appearance of a
respondent proceeded against by a suit in personam, and that in
the United States such process may issue whenever the defendant
has concealed himself or absconded from the country. A case
in Bee's Adm. Rep., p. 141, is referred to as an authority in this
country, and Clerke's Praxis by Hall, part 2, tit. 28, is cited for
the general practice of the civil law. The opinion of the court
shows further that the attachment was originally devised and is
still maintained as a means of compelling the respondent to
appear in the suit to answer, and that this is its primary object,
while if he does, nevertheless, not appear, the goods, &c., may
be sold to satisfy the libellant.
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In Cushing v. Laird, recently decided in the District Court of
the United States for the Southern District of New York, Judge
BLATCHFORD has examined the subject further, and concludes
mainly upon the authority of the case of Almeida and of the text
.of Clerke's Praxis, that the jurisdiction and power to attach
property to compel an appearance also exists in this country
where the defendant is not an inhabitant of the United States,
but is an alien not found within the district but having property
there which can be attached:
With these decisions the case now before me raises no controversy. They are in perfect consistency with the ground relied
upon by the respondents here, to wit, that, being in a legal sense
inhabitants of the District of New Jersey, they could not be sued
in the Eastern District of New York by process of attachment
and seizure of their goods.
And it is of great pertinency to say that recognising the principles and practice sanctioned by the decisions above referred to
completely satisfies the provisions of the Acts of Congress already
cited, and gives a proper and sufficient field for the operation of
the act regulating the practice of tlte court and the rule of the
Supreme Court of the United States prescribing the process of
attachment when the defendant cannot be found within the
district; for by these decisions, if he be concealed or have absconded or be an alien non-resident, there is occasion for the
process.
The question then recurs, and entirely without conflict with
those statutes or with the rule of court or with those decisions,
Can an inhabitant of the United States be sued in a court of
admiralty by process of attachment of his goods issued and
served to compel his appearance in any other district than that
whereof he is an inhabitant ?
The Judiciary Act of 1789 establishes the judicial tribunals,
defines their location and the times of holding courts, distributes
and limits their jurisdiction and regulates the manner of its
exercise, with other details to complete the system (Act of September 24th 1789, to establish the judicial courts of the United
States, 1 Sess., ch. 20. 1 Stat. 73).
By the first section the organization of the Supreme Court was
declared.
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By the second the United States was divided into judicial districts, limited and designated as therein prescribed.
By the third it was declared that there should be a district
court in each district, and its constitution and its sessions are
fixed.
By the fourth the districts (excepting Maine and Kentucky)
were divided and allotted to circuits (embracing several districts),
and circuit courts in each circuit provided for.
By the fifth the various sessions of the circuit court in the
respective circuits are appointed.
Organization being thus provided for, the sixth, seventh, and
eighth sections provide for adjournments, vacancies, continuances,
appointment of clerks, their oath of office, and the oaths of
office of the judges.
Then, in section nine, the jurisdiction of the district courts is
conferred: First of certain crimes and offences, and next, they
shall also have exclusive original cognisance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including seizures under
laws of import, &c., where the seizures are made on waters navigable, &c., within their respective districts, as well as on the
high seas; and shall have exclusive cognisance of all seizures on
land, &c., &c.; and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States; and shall have
cognisance concurrently with the courts of the several states or
the circuit courts of all cases where an alien sues for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of thetUnited
States; and also concurrently, as last mentioned, of all suits at
common law, where the United States sue and the amount in
dispute amounts * * to one hundred dollars; and also of suits
against consuls, &c. &c.
The tenth section gives to the District Court in Kentucky
certain circuit-court powers.
And the eleventh section defines the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court, and provides as follows: "That the Circuit Court shall
have original cognisance concurrent with the courts of the several states of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
when the matter in dispute exceeds (exclusive of costs) the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between
a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of
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another state. And shall have exclusive cognisance of all crimes
and offences cognisable under the authority of the United States,
except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the
United States shall otherwise direct, and concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognisable
therein.
Then follow two provisions, the effect of which is especially
important to the question under consideration, viz. : "But no
person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in
any civil action before a circuit or di~trict court.
" And no civil suit shall be brought 6efore either of said courts
against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ."
The further and other provisions-of the statute it is unnecessary
to recite, as they do not bear on the question; but it is of some
significance to note that the Constitution of the United States had
already provided that the trial of all crimes (except in cases of
impeachment) * * shall be held in the state where the said
crimes shall have been committed (art. 8, sect. 2, subd. 3). And
an amendment proposed by the same Congress, and at the same
session at which the Judiciary Act was passed, provided that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused should enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed. (Amendment 6th to the Constitution.)
That an attachment of goods to compel appearance and a
holding thereof to answer any claim which a plaintiff may recover is original process within the meaning of the language of
the statute above quoted is not doubtful. That these courts
cannot send their process into another district in suits at common law or in equity, and thereby obtain jurisdiction of the
person, is also clear. That in actions at common law or in
equity they cannot proceed by attachment and so obtain jurisdiction of a person who is an inhabitant of another district is settled; and indeed it is not here denied by the counsel for the
libellants, that in such actions the statute applies according to its
very terms, and that in order to sustain jurisdiction the defendant
must be an inhabitant of the district in which the suit is brought
or be found therein, if the defendant be an inhabitant of any
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of the United States (see Piaequetv. Swan, 5 Mason 35; Toland
v. Sprague, 22 Pet. 300; Ex parte Graham, 4 Wash. 0. C. R.
456; mfollingsworth v. Adams, 2 Dall. 396; -Dayv. Newark India
_Rubber Co., 1 Blatch. 628, which applies the principle to a corporation created by the laws of another state; Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 0. 0. R. 212).
If, then, the present is a civil suit, within the meaning of the
act, there is an end of the question, and jurisdiction of the defendant could not be acquired by attachment of goods.
1. The restriction cited, and which forms part of the eleventh
section, is not confined in its operation to the jurisdiction conferred by that section. This is clear, because.no civil jurisdiction is by that section conferred upon the district courts, and yet
the restriction forbids that any civil suit shall be brought before
either the district or circuit court in any other district, &c. The
words "district court," or "either of said courts," would be
senseless and inoperative if the restriction did not apply to other
actions than those which were authorized by that section. The
terms therefore plainly apply to the District Court in the exercise
of some jurisdiction theretofore mentioned, and must operate to
limit or explain the powers given to those courts in the previous
ninth section. Including both courts in terms, the limitation
operates upon the jurisdiction of each conferred by that statute.
This is also settled by the cases cited, for if it were otherwise
then the District Court could, in the exercise of such cgmmonlaw jurisdiction as is given by the ninth section, proceed by
attachment.
2. The Congress of the United States, when this restriction
was imposed, were in the very act of framing a judicial system:
they provided for the organization of the courts, for a distribution
thereof throughout the states, bringing the federal tribunals
within easy approach by every citizen for the determination of
Their'
controversies deemed appropriate to these tribunals.
chiefly
made
to
depend
was
as
to
subject-matter
jurisdiction
upon the nature of the subjects and the residence of the parties
who, when of different states, might prefer a tribunal existing
and acting in freedom from state influence. The courts of
original jurisdiction were located in each district. As they acted
not under local authority, but derived their power from a government embracing the entire Union, they might seem warranted
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in entertaining suits against defendants residing in any state
however remote, and in sending process for service compelling
appearance. It was, therefore, of great and manifest importance
that some rule on this subject should be prescribed, and it was
done, so as to prevent parties proceeded against from being called
to a great distance to defend actions brought against them, when
there was a federal tribunal at their own door competent to
administer justice.
3. There is, therefore, no possible reason for any distinction
in this respect between a suit in admiralty and a suit in equity,
or a suit at law. A suit in per8onam, in the court in admiralty,
is within the jurisdiction of that court when founded on a maritime contract, or prosecuted for a marine tort. But no reason
can be stated for requiring a party living in New Orleans or San
Francisco to come to New York to defend an action or suit on
the covenants in a charter-party, when he ought not to be required
to come there to defend a suit at law, or in equity, founded on
any commercial or common-law contract. For a marine tort
committed by a resident of New Orleans he is liable at common
law, and may also be held liable in the court of admiralty. There
is no just reason for holding him to answer in such case in any
district court of the United States, however remote, if the plaintiff elects to proceed in admiralty, while if the plaintiff proceed
at common law he must sue in the district of the defendant's
residence, or in the district in which he may be found. The
reason of the Act of Congress includes suits in personam in admiralty as fully as suits in equity or at law.
4. The word "1civil" is used in the Act of Congress in distinction from "1criminal." In the ninth and eleventh sections, conferring jurisdiction on the district and circuit courts, Congress
had spoken of "1crimes and offences," " civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction," " suits for penalties and forfeitures,"
"causes where an alien sues for a tort," " suits at common law,"
"suits against consuls" other than "for offences," "suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity," and then declared that
"no civil suit" shall be brought, &c. A civil cause of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction is prosecuted by a suit. It is within
the terms of the restriction as clearly as a "1cause where an alien
sues for a tort." It was wholly unnecessary in the restrictive
clause to recite again the several terms previously employed, as
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suits for forfeiture, suits against consuls, suits at common law,
&c., and civil causes in admiralty. These are all civil in their
nature. A cause in admiralty is so expressly described; it is a
civil cause. The general term civil suit was apt to describe all
these actions and causes of action, and it was so employed; and
for the reason that as the Constitution provided that criminal
prosecutions, jurisdiction whereof was given by this act to the
circuit and district courts, should be had in the state where the
crime was committed, so also civil suits aghinst an inhabitant of
the United States should be brought in the district whereof he
was an inhabitant. Jurisdiction of crimes and offences as well
as of proceeding of a civil nature being conferred on these courts
by the sections mentioned, this classification by the word civil
as distinguished from criminal was an essential conformity to the
constitutional requirement that crimes and offences should be
prosecuted where committed. The restriction, therefore, made the
system in this respect complete.
5. This view of the effect of this statute securing to inhabitants
of the several states the right of being sued within the district
whereof they are respectively inhabitants is therefore in perfect
consistency with the claim that courts of admiralty have general
power to proceed in yereonam by attachment of goods where
the defendant cannot be found within the district, so far as that
is asserted in Aanro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 478, or in Zing v.
Shepard, 3 Story 849, Boyd v. Urquardt, 1 Sprague 423,
Bonyson v. Miller, Bee 186. The limitation is the result of
the act of Congress, and does not deny the original jurisdiction
or practice of those courts, nor their present power or jurisdiction
when the respondent is an alien non-resident, or being an inhabitant conceals himself or absconds so that he cannot be
found.
6. To the suggestion that the Acts of Congress regulating the
process and practice of the courts are in such general terms that
they and the rule of the Supreme Court in admiralty have
operated to modify the Act of 1789, limiting jurisdiction in this
respect, it is sufficient to say, that these acts are not designed to
alter or enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts, but only to regulate the exercise of jurisdiction where it exists. I understand
this to be distinctly affirmed in Toland v. Sprague, already cited.
Indeed, if these acts are held to authorize the Supreme Court
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by rule to abrogate the restriction in the Act of 1789, in any respect, it cannot be confined to the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty, for the Act of 1842 (relied upon as above) gives the same
power touching proceedings at the common law and in equity as
in admiralty, and the construction and effect contended for would
enable that court practically to repeal all the restrictions contained
in the Act of 1789, on this subject, and authorize common-law
actions against inhabitants of any state to be brought in any district of the United States.
Of the case of Clarke v. The New Jersey Steam Navigation
Company, 1 Story 531, and the New Jersey Steam Navigation
Company v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, it is jufficient to say
that the point discussed in this case was neither raised nor decided in either. And the first-named is full to the effect above
asserted, that on this question a corporation stands in the same
position as a natural person. The effect of the eleventh section
of the Judiciary Act on the power of the court to proceed against
either was not raised, discussed, or decided. The decision in the
last-named case related first to the merits, and second to the
inquiry whether the case was in its nature cognisable in a court
of admiralty. The synopsis of the case first named, as reported,
would suggest that the point in question was decided adversely
to the views I have expressed, but, in truth, the point was not
raised, the opinion stating that it had not been doubted, and
refers to the general doctrine of .Tianro v. Almeida, with which
my views are in no conflict. The case last referred to suggests
what is perhaps sufficiently obvious without discussion, that the
jurisdiction of courts of admiralty by libel and process in rem
is in no conflict but is in entire harmony with the views I have
expressed. For in those cases the court have jurisdiction of the
rem wholly irrespective of the question to whom it belongs. For
all the purposes of the proceeding the liability rests upon the
rem, and it is made to answer. In form and in substance that,
and that only, is charged. It is a proceeding for the enforcement
of a maritime lien already existing or acquired by the seizure of
the subject of the lien, and to be enforced against it, without
regard to questions of title or ownership, and one who intervenes
as claimant does so not to defend himself from liability, but for
the protection of the rem proceeded against. Nor is the right
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of intervention at all confined to one who is liable upon the same
cause of action. Such a proceeding-in very form adverse, not
to an inhabitant of the United States, but to a rem or subject,
within the district, upon which the liability was chargeable-was
so clearly according to the established jurisdiction and practice
of the courts of admiralty that it must have been recognised by
Congress, and neither the words of the act, nor any reasonable
implication therefrom affect it.
I have examined the opinion of Judge SHIPMAN of the District
Court of the United States for Connecticut, in Blair v. Bemis
et al., in Admiralty (August 1863), and of Judge HOFFMAN of
the District Court of the United States for California, in Vilsona
v. Pieree (15 Law Reporter 187, July 1852), and am constrained
to concur in their conclusion. Their opinions embody many of
the views I have suggested, and very ably, I think, present most
of the considerations pertinent to the subject, with the authorities.
In the opinion of the District Court in this case, the opposite
conclusion is. ably sustained, and the practice said to be of long
standing in the Southern District of New York is stated to be in.
conformity with his conclusion. If I could satisfy myself that
such practice was not forbidden by the Judiciary Act, I should
prefer to make no decision disturbing such practice. I have,
therefore, retained the case for further and more deliberate consideration 8everal months. I am, however, by my convictions,
compelled to concur with the conclusions of Judges RolPFMAN
and SHIPMAN, and to hold that jurisdiction of the defendants
was not acquired by the District Court by the attachment in this
case.
The decree herein must, therefore, be reversed, and the stipulators be discharged from their stipulations provisionally given,
as before stated.
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